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The Role of Search Engine Optimization in Search
Marketing
Abstract
Web sites invest significant resources in trying to influence their visibility among online
search results. In addition to paying for sponsored links, they invest in methods known as search
engine optimization (SEO) that improve the ranking of a site among the search results without
improving its quality. We study the economic incentives of Web sites to invest in SEO and its
implications on search engine and advertiser payoffs. We find that the process is equivalent to
an all-pay auction with noise and headstarts. Our results show that, under certain conditions,
a positive level of search engine optimization improves the search engine’s ranking quality and
thus the satisfaction of its visitors. In particular, if the quality of sites coincides with their
valuation for visitors then search engine optimization serves as a mechanism that improves the
ranking by correcting measurement errors. While this benefits consumers and increases traffic
to the search engine, sites participating in search engine optimization could be worse off due to
wasteful spending unless their valuation for traffic is very high. We also investigate how search
engine optimization affects the revenues from sponsored links. Surprisingly, we find that in
many cases search engine revenues are increased by SEO.
1 Introduction
Online search engines are among the most popular tools that consumers use to discover in-
formation on the Web. As a result, search engine marketing is becoming a dominant form of
online advertising. By utilizing search marketing, Web sites that wish to expose their content
and merchandize to consumers can reach them when they search for specific keywords providing
invaluable targeting opportunities.
In order to accommodate advertisers, most search engines have divided their search results
page into an organic and a sponsored part. The left side of the screen is typically used to
display organic results as a ranked list of site links ordered according to their relevance for the
search query. The parts above and to the right of the organic results are often used to display
sponsored links which are typically auctioned to advertisers using various mechanisms. Selling
sponsored links is typically the leading revenue stream for search engines, and in many cases it
is the only revenue stream. During the sales process, advertisers submit bids for having their
ads placed among the sponsored links, and generally the highest bidders win the most visible
links1, usually on the top of the list.
In addition to buying sponsored links, many websites and advertisers try to find their way
to the top of the organic results list by influencing the search engine’s ranking algorithm.
Since the organic links are viewed by consumers as more trustworthy, websites receive positive
benefits from visitors arriving through clicks on them. The collection of different actions that
a site can take to improve its position on the organic list is called search engine optimization
(SEO). Improving one’s position can be accomplished either by making the site more relevant
for consumers, or by investing in techniques that affect the search engine’s quality ranking
process solely. These two types of SEO techniques are sometimes referred to as white hat SEO
and black hat SEO respectively. The important difference is that white hat SEO improves the
site content, thus increasing visitor satisfaction and making the site more relevant, while black
hat SEO only improves the ranking of a site among search results without affecting its quality.
1The more sophisticated auction mechanisms also take into account parameters such as the the likelihood
of a click on a given link, or the quality of the landing page the ad leads to, estimating them from historical
click-through data.
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Examples of black hat techniques are eliciting external linking to the site or changing the site’s
pages to manipulate the ranking process of the search engine. Our focus in this paper is on
black hat SEO methods, which we plainly call SEO. White hat methods can be seen as purely
content investments, and we refer to them briefly in our concluding remarks.
Influencing the relevance measurement of search engines requires an investment of resources,
many times in the form of a service company being hired to perform SEO. Search engines typ-
ically take a stance against black hat SEO and consider it cheating. In some cases, websites
caught conducting SEO activities are removed from the organic list2. To set the rules, search
engines sometimes publish guidelines describing undesired practices. Google, for example, pro-
hibits buying incoming links to increase one’s PageRank3. Yahoo, on the other hand, simply
does not give weight to a paid link if they think it is not valuable to consumers4. In addition to
simply stating what they consider allowable, search engines can also invest significant amounts
in reducing the effectiveness of certain SEO activities5.
To justify their position, search engines typically claim that manipulation of search engine
results hurts consumer satisfaction and decreases the welfare of “honest” sites. In contrast to
that, search engines also convey a puzzling message that the auction mechanism for sponsored
links ensures that the best advertisers will obtain the links of highest quality, resulting in higher
social and consumer welfare. Is not the case of SEO similar? If the most resourceful sites are
the ones providing the best links, why not let them invest in improving their rankings?
We stipulate that a major reason for search engines’ reluctance in allowing SEO is the trade-
off advertisers face between investing in sponsored links and investing in influencing organic
rankings. As a result, search engines may be unhappy if sites spend significant amounts on
SEO activities instead of on paid links and content creation. One possible solution is to allow
payments for organic links and to pocket the money that sites would have otherwise paid to
2BBC News reported that Google has blacklisted BMW.de for breaching its guidelines. See
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4685750.stm
3Google Webmaster Central: http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=66356
4Interview with Priyank Garg, director of product management for Yahoo! Search Technology:
http://www.stonetemple.com/articles/interview-priyank-garg.shtml
5In response to Google’s regular updates of its search algorithm, different sites shuﬄe up and down wildly in
its search rankings. This phenomenon, which happens two or three times a year is called the “Google Dance”
by search professionals who give names to these events as they do for hurricanes (see “Dancing with Google’s
spiders”, The Economist, March 9, 2006).
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third parties. An example of such an implementation, Baidu, the leading Chinese search engine
and the world’s third largest, does accept payments for organic links6.
The above examples show that it is not clear what role search engine optimization plays
in the online advertising ecosystem and whether it is necessarily detrimental. Our goal is to
explore the economics of the SEO process and its effects on consumers, advertisers and search
engines. Specifically, we focus on the interaction between investment in SEO and in sponsored
links, and the resulting effects. By doing so, we are able to uncover the conditions under which
manipulation of ranking results is harmful to consumers7 and other stakeholders. We are also
able to provide recommendations to search engines on SEO policy, and to advertisers on how
to optimally invest in or against SEO.
Our main results in Section 4 show that black hat SEO can be advantageous to the search
engine and can increase traffic and consumer welfare in equilibrium. In particular, if sites’
valuation for traffic is aligned with their relevance (quality) then consumers are better off with
some positive level of SEO than without, resulting in a higher traffic to the search engine.
If, on the other hand, there are sites which extract high value from visitors yet provide them
with little value then SEO is generally detrimental to the search engine and consumer welfare.
An example of such a “bad” site, which is often called a spam site, is a site that advertises
products for a very low price to lure visitors, but later on uses the visitors’ credit card details
for fraudulent activities8.
According to our main results, SEO can be beneficial to consumers under some conditions
by moving the higher quality sites higher among the organic results. Although this may result
in higher traffic to the search engine, it is not clear what implication it has on the search engine’s
profit from sponsored links. Normally, more traffic to the search page implies higher revenues
for the search engine. Moreover, the size of the audience depends on the quality of the service
which in this case is the quality of search results visitors can expect. This logic yields that
search engines should offer the highest quality organic results to maximize revenues. However,
as the organic and sponsored lists are competing for consumer attention and the same sites
6Baidu scandal makes it to CCTV: http://shanghaiist.com/2008/11/23/baidu scandal makes it to cctv.php
7Wilbur and Zhu (2009) study click fraud driven by a similar motivation.
8Researchers estimate (Benczur et al. 2008) that 10-20% of Web sites constitute spam.
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may appear on both lists, the search engine would have an incentive to offer suboptimal results
on the organic side (White 2009, Taylor 2010).
It is not clear how the search engine should resolve this potential conflict between the two
lists. Even though organic links bring in visitors, if the results are too satisfactory they do not
click on the sponsored links. Furthermore, if advertisers receive enough visits through organic
links, they potentially have lower willingness to pay for sponsored visits. Thus, one may argue
that advertisers who spend resources on SEO, will spend less on sponsored links. We investigate
this problem in Section 5 where we study the interaction between the SEO contest for organic
links and the auction for sponsored links. We find that, surprisingly, SEO not only leads to
higher traffic in many cases, but also increases search engine revenues under certain conditions.
This follows from a more general finding that sponsored revenues are not necessarily hurt by
better quality organic link. Indeed, when the best quality site acquires the top organic link, the
second best site might pay a higher price for the sponsored link than in the reverse case. As
part of the SEO profitability analysis we identify the exact conditions under which providing
high quality organic links is profitable for the search engine.
Despite the apparent importance of the topic, there has been very little research done on
search engine optimization. At the same time, search engine optimization has grown to become
a multi-billion dollar business9. Many papers have focused on the sponsored side of the search
page and some on the interaction between the two lists. In all of these cases, however, the
ranking of a website in the organic list is given as exogenous, and the possibility of investing
in SEO is ignored, although marketers often face the problem whether and how much to invest
in SEO. Our results provide useful insights to firms involved in search marketing and to search
engines. Furthermore, given that search engines are a major gateway for information discovery,
there is an emerging debate on the fairness of search results and ranking algorithms, and the
possibility of regulating search engines. We hope our results will contribute to this discussion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of a small selection
of this diverse literature and other research areas that are relevant to our work. In Section 3 we
describe the main model and in Section 4 we present the equilibrium outcomes of a simplified
9See the survey conducted by seomoz.com at http://www.seomoz.org/dp/seo-industry-survey-results.
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case with only one organic link. Next, we examine the interaction between the SEO game and
the sponsored auction in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 generalizes our model in several ways
to show that our main results are robust, and introduces new results on analysis of contests
for multiple items with asymmetric players. All proofs and technical details appear in the
Appendix.
2 Relevant Literature
The rapid growth of the online advertising industry led to a surge in research dedicated to this
phenomenon. We review just a select few of the large volume of works related to our research.
Works such as those by Rutz and Bucklin (2007) and Ghose and Yang (2009) focus on consumer
response to search advertising and the different characteristics that impact advertising efficiency.
Another major stream of research, including works by Edelman et al. (2007), Varian (2007),
Zhu and Wilbur (2010) and Athey and Nekipelov (2010) focus mostly on the auction mechanism
used by the different search engines to allocate their advertising slots. Other recent examples,
such as those by Chen and He (2006), Athey and Ellison (2009) and Aggarwal et al. (2008)
analyze models that include both consumers and advertisers as active players.
A number of recent papers study the interplay between the organic list and the sponsored
list. Katona and Sarvary (2010) show that the top organic sites may not have an incentive
to bid for sponsored links. In an empirical piece, Yang and Ghose (2010) show that organic
links have a positive effect on click-through-rates on paid links, potentially increasing profits.
Taylor (2010), White (2009) and Xu et al. (2009) study how the incentives of the search engine
to provide high quality organic results are affected by potential losses on sponsored links. The
general notion is that search engines have an incentive to provide lower quality results in order
to maximize revenues.
Our model makes extensive use of methodologies related to all-pay auctions and contests.
For a survey of the literature on contests10, see Konrad (2007) and Sisak (2009). Specifically,
our analysis takes into account asymmetries among websites as well as ranking error of the
search engine. Kirkegaard (2009) describes the equilibria in contests with asymmetric players,
10Contests are all-pay competitions among bidders where the bids do not reach the auctioneer
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while Siegel (2009) analyzed such games under more general conditions. Our application is
unique in that it considers the cases where the initial asymmetry is biased by noise inherent
in the quality measurement process. Krishna (2007) and Athey and Nekipelov (2010) are two
of the few examples taking noise into consideration in an auction setting. This noise is the
main reason for the initially inefficient allocation of organic link slots, which can be corrected
by allowing for SEO.
Little attention was given to search engine optimization, although the use of SEO techniques
is common practice. Works such as those by Pasquale (2006) Bracha and Pasquale (2007) and
Mercadante (2008) consider the implications of search results manipulation using the traditional
view that “cheating” has strictly negative results. Different options for regulation and the need
(and legality) for it are examined. The economic implications of using bribes in contests is
analyzed by Clark and Riis (2000). An important result is that allocative efficiency is not
necessarily degraded by a bribery procedure, but might increase depending on the contest’s
parameters.
The work of Xing and Lin (2006) resembles ours the most by defining “algorithm quality”
and “algorithm robustness” to describe the search engine’s ability to accurately identify relevant
websites. Their paper shows that when advertisers’ valuation for organic links is high enough,
providers of SEO services are profitable, while search engines’ profits suffer. The strategic effect
of the increase in consumer’s satisfaction in not taken into account in their analysis. An earlier
work by Sen (2005) develops a theoretical model that examines the optimal strategy of mixing
between investing in SEO and buying ad placements. The model surprisingly shows that SEO
should not exist as part of an equilibrium strategy.
3 Model
We set up a static game to model the competition of advertisers for consumers who search for a
specific key phrase online. We assume there is a monopolistic search engine (SE) that provides
search results to consumers by displaying links to one of n websites that can also buy sponsored
links from the search engine. Whenever a consumer enters the search phrase, the search engine
ranks the different websites according to a scoring mechanism, and presents the n links ranked
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according to their scores. The search engine, advertisers, and consumers each have different
incentives and characteristics affecting their decisions as described below.
3.1 The Search Engine
A search engine is a website that provides searching results as a service to its visitors: they
enter queries (search phrases) into a search form and the SE returns a k number of results for
this query displaying them in an ordered list. This list - often referred to as the organic list -
contains a number of links to other websites in the order of the relevance of their content for
the given search phrase. In our model, we focus on a single keyword and we assume that the
relevance, or quality of a search result is essentially the probability that a consumer is satisfied
with the site once clicking on the link11. In addition to the organic results, the search engine
displays m sponsored links to generate revenue. Sponsored links are typically displayed above
and rightward of the organic results for a search query and look similar to the search results,
but are clearly marked as advertisement. These links are sold to advertisers through an auction
in which they submit bids and are awarded different positions on the page. The outcome of
the auction is usually determined by the order of the bids - corrected for the differences in the
likelihood that consumers click on a particular link - and each advertiser pays the next highest
(corrected) bid. We assume that there is a second price auction to determine the allocation of
the sponsored link and the highest bidder receives the link.
In order to rank websites, the search engine uses information gathered from crawling algo-
rithms and data mining methods on the Internet. Let qi denote the relevance of site i in the
context of a given keyword. It is reasonable to assume that the search engine can only measure
quality with an error, and cannot observe it directly. The initial quality score that the SE
assigns to site i is thus sSi = qi + σεi, where εi are assumed to be independent and are drawn
from the same distribution and σ is a scaling parameter measuring the standard deviation of
the error. If the Web sites do not take any action the results will be ordered according to the
sSi ’s as assigned by the search engine. If, however, Web sites can invest in SEO, they have
11The results remain unchanged if we assume that quality is the expected utility a random consumer gets
when clicking on a link
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the option to influence their position after observing the initial scores12. The effectiveness of
SEO is measured by the parameter α in the following way. If site i invests a bi amount in
SEO, its final score becomes sFi = s
S
i + αbi. That is, depending on the effectiveness of SEO,
sites can influence their score to a varying extent which in turn determines their final location
in the organic list of search results. The parameter α essentially measures how easy it is to
change one’s ranking using SEO methods. That is, 1/α can be interpreted as the cost of SEO
which, among other factors, can be influenced by the search engine. Indeed, if the search engine
ignores the possibility of SEO activities, α presumably increases. We do not explicitly model
the search engine’s decision to invest in changing α, we rather compare the SE’s payoff under
different α’s providing a recommendation on the optimal values.
We assume that the SE receives T amount of traffic that is a function of how satisfied
consumers are with the search results. Let U denote the expected satisfaction of a consumer
from visiting the search engine13. Then, it is natural to assume that T = f(U) where f() is
an increasing function, since the higher the expected satisfaction of a visitor the higher the
likelihood of a visit. We assume that the expectations are rational in that they match the
actual satisfaction level of the consumers. However, one could imagine a situation in which it
is hard for consumers to form reasonable expectations - that would be captured by a constant
f() function. Essentially, f() measures consumers’ sensitivity to the quality they can expect at
the search engine and their ability to form correct expectations. Using the above notation, the





where piS(t) is the SE’s revenue from sponsored links for visitor t.
3.2 Websites/Advertisers
We assume that there are n websites providing informational content or products to consumers
and that those sites derive some utility from the visiting consumers. We index the sites in
12We do not explicitly model who conducts the SEO activities. It could be the site itself, a third party, or in
the extreme case, the search engine itself.
13This includes expected utility from visiting sponsored links. Our results are very similar if we assume that
consumers only include organic links in their expectations.
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decreasing order of their quality: q1 ≥ q2 ≥ . . . qn. The quality of a site is essentially the
probability that a consumer that visits the site is satisfied14. The sites’ profits primarily depend
on their traffic. We assume that site i has a valuation of Ri(t), for t amount of clicks. Let
ri(t) = R
′
i(t) be the incremental valuation of site i for an extra click, where we assume that
Ri() is differentiable and ri() is non-negative and weakly decreasing. In essence, we assume that
each site has a positive valuation for any click, but the valuation is non-increasing. This is a
relatively flexible setup, as it allows us to incorporate traditional decreasing returns arguments,
but also to capture a typical scenario of the digital world, in which there is no difference between
two clicks. Furthermore, it also allows us to capture advertisers that have a steady valuation
for successive clicks but are bound by cash-flow limitations and operate on a fixed budget. An
advertiser has two types of possible costs – investment in SEO and buying sponsored links. We
let bi be the investment in SEO and pi be the cost of buying sponsored links. The resulting
profit function for each advertiser is thus:
pii = Ri(ti)− bi − pi (2)
The traffic ti a website experiences depends on the behavior of consumers using the search
engine, which we now describe.
3.3 Consumers
The behavior of consumers in our model is relatively simple, but captures different behaviors
identified by the literature. Most papers assume that consumers click passively without evalu-
ating the differences between links. Recent papers (Chen and He 2006, Athey and Ellison 2009,
Yang and Ghose 2010, Jeziorski and Segal 2009, Yao and Mela 2010) point out that visitors
exhibit utility maximizing characteristics. To incorporate this in our model, we assume that
a consumer may be able to make inferences about the quality of the links without clicking
on them, thus, we assume that a consumer is sophisticated with probability ψ and selects the
link that offers the highest quality15. If the consumer is not able to determine which is the
14One can imagine a detailed model of consumer satisfaction, based on consumer heterogeneity in tastes and
preferences. We use this basic 0− 1 setup to capture the main differences between sites’ qualities.
15If the same link appears on both the organic and sponsored list, as a tie-braking rule, we assume that a
sophisticated consumer selects the organic link, but this assumption is not crucial for our results.
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highest quality link (with probability 1− ψ) then he or she randomly chooses a link on either
the organic list or the sponsored list. Naturally there are differences in probabilities based on
a link’s position in the list and whether the link is organic or sponsored. The probability with
which a non-sophisticated consumer clicks on link i in the organic list is γβi and (1 − γ)βi in
the sponsored list. We naturally assume that β1 ≥ β2 ≥ ... ≥ βn and
∑∞
i=0 βi ≤ 1. That is γ
captures the proportion of non-sophisticated clicks on the organic side, whereas βi capture the
order effects. Once the consumer clicks on a link that belongs to site j s/he is satisfied with
probability qj, receiving a utility normalized to 1 if satisfied. To determine the number of clicks
received by a site, let Φji denote an indicator that takes the value of 1 if site i is located in the
organic position j and 0 otherwise, let χji be the same for the jth sponsored link, and finally let
Ψi denote the indicator that takes a value of 1 if site i is the highest quality site on the entire
page. With these, the traffic received by site i is
ti = T
[
















The sequence of the game is the following. First the search engine measures the relevance of
each website and publishes sSi = qi+σεi. Next, the websites, after observing s
S
i , simultaneously
decide how much to invest in SEO, changing the scores to sFi = s
S
i + α · bi. The search engine
then recalculates the scores and displays an ordered list of search results sorted in a decreasing
order of the final site scores sFi . When the organic ranking has been settled, advertisers bid for
the sponsored links and participate in a second price auction that determines the sponsored link
to be shown to all visitors16. Each visitor clicks on the results according to the sequence defined
above and payoffs are realized at the end. Our assumption on the timing of the above events is
somewhat simplistic, but it is the most plausible way of capturing Web sites’ reactions to their
ranking results and their subsequent investment in SEO and bids for sponsored links. Later,
in Section 6, we relax our assumption on the information structure and employ an incomplete
16One could assume that advertisers can adjust their bids or, at the extreme, bid for each click separately.
This setup would not change our results substantially, but simplifying assumptions need to be made to find an
equilibrium in the sequential auctions.
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information setting. There, we assume that the search engine performs a measurement of the
quality each time a ranking is performed, and the error is not public. Websites then have
expectations about the error structure and spend their SEO efforts and make their bids in
advance.
Variable Notation
Number of sites n
Number of organic links k
Number of sponsored links m
Standard deviation of ranking error σ
Initial quality score assigned by SE to site i sSi
Final quality score assigned by SE to site i sFi
Effectiveness of SEO (inverse of cost of SEO) α
Quality of site i qi
Valuation of site i for a single link vi
Net revenue of site i from click Ri(ti)
Ranking error for site i εi
SEO investment by site i bi
Total amount paid by site i for sponsored link pi
Indicator denoting whether site i has organic link j Φji
Indicator denoting whether site i has sponsored link j χji
Indicator denoting whether site i has the highest quality Ψi
Proportion of sophisticated consumers ψ
Proportion of organic clicks γ
Click-through rate of position j in any list βj
Expected consumer satisfaction U
Number of clicks to site i ti
Total traffic at SE T = f(U)
Table 1: Summary of Notation
We start our analysis by examining a simple case that illustrates the main forces governing
SEO. Here, we do not consider sponsored links (assume m = 0 or γ = 1), but rather focus on
the core effect of SEO on the organic ranking and its effects on search engine traffic. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that there is only one organic link displayed on the SE (k = 1,
also assuming β1 = 1) and that there are two bidders (n = 2). We examine the effects of the
presence of sponsored links in Section 5 and generalize to the case of n > 2 sites, and multiple
k > 1 links in Section 6.
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4 SEO Equilibrium - One Organic Link
Assume that two Web sites compete for a single organic link and let the distribution of εi take
the values of 1 or −1 with equal probabilities. We assume σ > |q1 − q2|/2 to ensure that the
error can affect the ordering of sites, otherwise the error never changes the order of results and
the setup is equivalent to one with no error. Although very simplistic, this setup allows us to
derive our main results on the forces governing the effects of SEO on the ranking of sites and
their payoffs. Let v1 and v2 denote the sites’ valuations for winning the auction, as derived
from their valuation functions and the traffic functions:
v1 = R1(f(q1)), v2 = R2(f(q2))
As a benchmark, let us examine the case in which search engine optimization is not possible,
i.e., when α = 0. In this case sites cannot influence their position among the search results.
Since q1 ≥ q2, the expected traffic arriving to the SE is 34f(q1) + 14f(q2). The error in measure-
ment thus causes a suboptimal allocation of the search link when compared to the first best
case of f(q1), leading to a drop in traffic.
When search engine optimization becomes effective, i.e., when α > 0, websites have a tool
to influence the order of results. The ability to influence, however, is typically asymmetric,
since sites have different starting scores sSi . A site that is in the first position in the SE’s initial
ranking has a headstart and hence can remain the first even if it invests less in SEO than
its competitor. Another characteristic of the game sites play is that their SEO investment is
sunk no matter what the outcome of the game is. Our first result states that sites essentially
participate in an all-pay auction with headstarts.
Lemma 1 The game that sites play after observing their starting scores is equivalent to an
all-pay auction with headstarts.
Appendix A discusses all-pay auctions with headstarts in detail, together with their equi-
librium characteristics and their application to our game. All-pay auctions with complete
information typically do not have pure-strategy Nash-equilibria. In a simple auction with two
13
Figure 1: The figure characterizes the mixed strategy equilibrium of an all-pay auction as a function
of the headstart of player 1. Sites’ valuations are v1 = 1.4 and v2 = 0.6. The probability that player
1 (player 2) wins is weakly increasing(decreasing) in the headstart, similarly to the payoffs.
players with valuations v1 > v2, both players mix between bidding 0 and v2 with different dis-
tributions17. Player 1, having the higher valuation, wins with the higher probability of v1/2v2
and player 2’s surplus is 0. Thus, only the player with the highest valuation makes a positive
profit in expectation, but the chance of winning gives an incentive to the other player to submit
positive bids. In the case of an all-pay auction with headstarts the equilibrium is very similar
and the player with the highest potential score (valuation plus headstart) wins with higher
probability and the other player’s expected surplus is 0. The winner’s expected surplus is equal
to the sum of differences in valuations and headstarts. Figure 1 illustrates the probabilities
that the two sites win and their payoffs as a function of the headstart.
4.1 The effect of SEO on traffic and consumer welfare
To examine the outcomes of the SEO game, we use ET (α) = ET (α;σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) to denote
the expected traffic the search engine receives based on different levels of SEO effectiveness and
valuations. In this simple case the probability that the player with the more relevant link wins
17See the Appendix for detailed bidding distributions.
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the auction (that is, player 1) directly determines the expected traffic as
ET (α;σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) = f(q2) + (f(q1)− f(q2)) Pr(Site 1 receives the organic link).
Note that the above probability is very closely related not only to the amount of traffic the
search engine receives, but also to the a priori expected consumer satisfaction which is EU =
q2 + (q1 − q2) Pr(Site 1 wins). For further reference, let P (α) = P (α;σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) denote the
probability of the desired outcome, that is, that site 1 receives the organic link.
If there is no SEO, that is, when α = 0 (and σ > |q1 − q2|/2), we have P (0) = 3/4. Our
goal is therefore to determine whether the probability exceeds this value for any positive α SEO
effectiveness levels. It is useful, however, to begin with analyzing how the probability depends
on valuations and qualities for given α and σ values. The following Lemma summarizes our
initial results.
Lemma 2 For any fixed α and σ, P (α;σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) is increasing in v1 and q1 and is de-
creasing in v2 and q2.
Thus, the probability of the desired outcome increases when the most relevant site becomes
even more relevant and also when its valuation for clicks increases. When there is no SEO, i.e.,
when α = 0, the Lemma holds because the efficiency simply does not change with v1, v2, q1, q2,
but when α > 0 the efficiency strictly increases and decreases in the respective variables. In
essence, the Lemma tells us that no matter how effective SEO is, the less sites valuations are
aligned with their relevance levels, the less efficient the rankings are.
The following proposition summarizes the main result of this section, showing how SEO
affects the traffic of the search engine.
Proposition 1
1. For any σ > |q1 − q2|/2, there exists a positive αˆ = αˆ(σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) SEO effectiveness
level such that ET (αˆ) ≥ ET (0).
2. If v1/v2 > 3/2 then for any σ > |q1 − q2|/2, there exists a positive αˆ = αˆ(σ, v1, v2, q1, q2)
such that ET (αˆ) > ET (0).
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3. If v1 < v2 and σ ≥ v2+v1v2−v1
q1−q2
2
then for any α > 0 we have ET (α) ≤ ET (0).
The first part of the proposition tells us that for any level of error there is a positive level
of SEO that does not reduce the traffic of the search engine. Practically, if the level of SEO
effectiveness is very low (that is, its cost is high) then firms will not invest and the ranking will
not be altered.
The second point yields more interesting results. Essentially, it demonstrates that positive
levels of search engine optimization do improve the the ranking in some cases. When high
quality sites value visitors relatively high compared to lower quality sites, SEO is beneficial to
both the search engine and consumers regardless of the level of error. The third part states
the opposite: when the player with the lower quality has a higher valuation then all positive
levels of SEO are detrimental to the efficiency (unless the error is very small). Although our
model assumes given deterministic valuations and qualities, one could imagine a setting where
these parameters are randomly drawn from a given distribution. In that case, our results yield
that the higher the correlation between a site’s quality and valuation, the more likely that SEO
improves efficiency18.
The intuition for the results is as follows. The SEO mechanism favors bidders with high
valuations. Since the SE cannot perfectly measure site qualities, this mechanism corrects some
of the error when valuations increase monotonically in quality. Furthermore, since valuations
for the organic link are based on the total expected traffic, they include a component that
is based on the site’s quality. Thus, a higher quality site has a valuation advantage even if
its valuation for a single click is the same as its low quality competitor’s. For example, if
valuations for additional clicks are not declining and are the same for all sites (ri(x) ≡ r), then
vi = r ·f(qi). Substituting in the results yields that SEO can be beneficial if f(q1)/f(q2) > 3/2.
Thus, if quality differences are high enough, the contest creates a force that favors high quality
sites even if the valuations for a single click are similar across sites.
When lower quality sites have very high valuations for traffic, however, SEO creates incen-
tives that are not compatible with the utilities of consumers or the search engine. In this latter
18If the joint distribution of vi and qi is lognormal then one can show that the condition for part 2 is more
likely to hold when the correlation between vi and qi is higher.
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case, the high valuation sites which are not relevant can get ahead by investing in SEO unless
the error is relatively small19. Examples are cases of “spammer” sites that mislead consumers.
In these cases consumers do not gain any utility from visiting such sites, but the sites may
profit from consumer visits.
Our result describe the outcomes in different cases and show that in many cases the SE is
better off allowing some positive level of SEO. It is not clear, however, what the optimal level
of SEO is in these cases. In particular, how does it depend on the variance of the measurement
error? To answer this, let Aˆ(σ) denote the set of α SEO effectiveness levels that maximize the
search engine’s traffic. For two sets A1 ⊆ R and A2 ⊆ R, we say that A1  A2 if and only if
for any α1 ∈ A1 there is an α2 ∈ A2 such that α2 ≤ α1 and for any α′2 ∈ A2 there is an α′1 ∈ A1
such that α′1 ≥ α′2.
Corollary 1 If v1/v2 > 3/2, then the optimal SEO effectiveness is increasing as the variance of
the measurement error increases. In particular, for any σ1 > σ2 > 0, we have Aˆ(σ1)  Aˆ(σ2).
Figure 2 illustrates the findings by depicting the probability of the higher valuation site
getting the organic link as a function of α for different values of σ. As the corollary states,
the optimal SEO effectiveness levels are increasing in σ. We have already shown that SEO can
be beneficial because it can serve as a mechanism that corrects the search engine’s error when
measuring how relevant sites are. The above corollary tells us that if the error is larger then
higher effectiveness of SEO is required to correct the error. This suggests, somewhat counter
intuitively, that investments against SEO on the SE’s part complement investment in better
search algorithms, and do not substitute them. That is, only search engines that are already
very good at estimating true qualities should fight hard against black hat SEO. Nevertheless,
measurement error is not always under the control of the search engine, but can depend on
external factors and vary from keyword to keyword. Therefore, it may make sense to allow
higher levels of SEO in areas where the quality measurement is very noisy. Another factor to
consider is that although higher levels of SEO may improve the ranking, the investments sites
19When σ is close to q1−q22 the probability of the desired outcome can slightly exceed 3/4 for some small α > 0
values. This happens because ineffective SEO gives player 1 the chance to win in cases when the error favors
player 2 while not affecting the other cases.
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Figure 2: The figure shows the probability that the higher quality site wins the organic link as a
function of SEO effectiveness for different error levels (v1 = 1.8, v2 = 1, q1 − q2 = 0.25).
make in it mostly end up at firms offering SEO services and not the SE. One solution to this
problem is to allow sites to pay for placing links among organic results, similar to what sites
such as Baidu.com or Yelp.com do. There are arguably many potential pitfalls to including
paid links as part of the organic results and we do not suggest that this is always optimal, but
our model does offer a plausible explanation as to why some search engines may do so.
4.2 The effect of SEO on advertiser profits
When SEO is effective, sites have a natural incentive to invest in SEO, which they do not have
when α = 0. In the extreme case of α → ∞ the difference in initial scores dissipates and
the game becomes a regular all-pay auction. If, for example, v1 > v2 then player 1’s expected
payoff is v1 − v2, whereas player 2 makes nothing in expectation. Comparing this to the case
in which there is no SEO - player 2 making v2/4 and player 1 making 3v1/4 - reveals that
player 2 is worse off with SEO whereas player 1 is better off iff v1 > 4v2. This implies that
high levels of SEO only increase profits for sites with outstanding valuations. The following
corollary provides detailed results on the sites’ payoffs.
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Corollary 2
1. If v1 > v2 then Player 2’s payoff is decreasing in α.
2. If v1 > v2 there always exists an α
∗ > 0 such that Player 1 is better off with an SEO
effectiveness level of α = α∗ than with α = 0. If v1 > 4v2 or σ < v1v2
q1−q2
2
then Player 1 is
strictly better off.
The player with the lower valuation is therefore worse off with higher SEO. Player 1, on the
other hand, is better off with a certain positive level of SEO, especially if its valuation is much
higher than its competitor’s and if the measurement error is small. The intuition from the
former follows from the fact that higher levels of SEO emphasize the differences in valuations,
and the higher the difference the more likely that the higher valuation wins. For the latter
condition, smaller measurement errors make it easier for the player with the higher starting
score to win and to take advantage of SEO. The corollary shows that the player with the higher
valuation is generally happy with some positive level of SEO.
5 SEO and Sponsored Links
In the previous section, we have focused on the effect of SEO on the traffic that the search
engine can maintain as an important determinant of the success and the profit of the SE. Here,
we examine the interplay between search engine optimization and the sale of sponsored (paid)
links to advertisers to uncover the direct revenue effects of SEO and combine them with the
results on traffic.
We first examine the case in which consumers are not sophisticated and randomly choose
between the sponsored and the organic link, that is when ψ = 0. The following proposition
summarizes our results in this case:
Proposition 2
1. If R1(f(q1)) > (3/2)R2(f(q2)), then for any σ > |q1 − q2|/2, there exists a γ < 1 and a
positive αˆ = αˆ(σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) SEO effectiveness level such that if γ > γ then ET (αˆ) ≥
ET (0), and
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2. EpiSE(αˆ) > EpiSE(0) if and only if R1(f(q1))−R1(γf(q1)) ≥ R2(f(q2))−R2(γf(q2)).
The results show that SEO optimization can be beneficial not only in increasing traffic, but
surprisingly, it can also increase the expected revenues of the search engine from sponsored
links. In particular, if a high enough proportion of visitors click on the organic links, there
is a positive level of SEO for any error level that increases the traffic of the SE by improving
the expected quality of the organic link. The intuition for the results on the traffic is similar
to our basic model: if the high quality site has a valuation that is high enough relative to its
competitor, it has a good incentive to invest in SEO, correcting the error that the SE had
possibly made when ranking them. Increased traffic is certainly important, but it may result
in lower profits if the revenues from sponsored links go down. The proposition specifies the
condition under which SE revenues increase: if the valuation of the higher quality site is high
enough for the remaining clicks after acquiring the organic link relative to its competitor. To
better understand this scenario the following corollary provides sufficient conditions for it to
hold.
Corollary 3 Expected search engine profits increase with a higher traffic if any of the following
hold:
1. |r′1()| < δ with a sufficiently small δ > 0.
2. q1/q2 < 1 + β with a sufficiently small β > 0
3. f ′() is not too high.
First, when advertisers’ revenue functions are decreasing slowly (in particular, the higher
quality site’s revenue) then sponsored revenues go up as a result of the traffic increase. This is
easy to see, if one considers constant marginal revenues. If sites’ valuation for a click is constant
no matter the amount of clicks, the competition for organic links and the bidding for sponsored
links becomes independent. Thus, if SEO result in a higher overall traffic, revenues can only
increase as the identity of the sponsored winner does not change. A similar intuition holds when
marginal returns are decreasing at a low enough rate. Second, when the quality differences are
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not too high or when consumers are not very sensitive to expected link quality, revenues also
increase. The rationale behind this result is that when the higher quality site wins the organic
link, it has a lowered incentive to bid for the sponsored link yielding that the second highest
quality site will obtain them. However, the price that site 2 pays is based on site 1’s residual
valuations (lower than its valuation for the first clicks), which is higher than what site 1 would
pay based on site 2’s residual valuations. However, if the fact that the higher quality site (1)
gets the organic link results in a large increase in traffic, the residual valuation of site 1 for
the sponsored link may be lower than the residual valuation of site 2. That is, although the
search engine benefits from the fact that site 1’s high quality organic link attracts more traffic,
the sponsored prices may go down if site 1 becomes ”saturated” with organic clicks and has
a decreased valuation for them reducing the pressure in the sponsored auction. Condition 2
in the proposition quantifies this exactly, whereas condition 2 in the corollary makes sure this
does not happen.
The above logic holds in more general cases as well. Indeed, if there are more players in
the sponsored auction, the chances that revenues go down with high traffic are low. If we pool
the valuations of many other potential players for the sponsored link, the only case when SE
revenues go down is when site 1 and 2’s valuations are high enough to surpass the rest of the
players even after acquiring the organic link. Otherwise, an increase in traffic will lead to an
increase in revenues.
We now relax the important assumption that consumers choose between the organic and
sponsored links randomly while ingoring their expected qualities (ψ = 0). We consider the case
when visitors can possibly identify (with a ψ probability) the best link among the results. To
make the analysis tractable we assume a simple linear form for the marginal valuations, where
r1(t) = r1 · (1− t) and r2(t) = r2 · (1− t) and r denotes r2/r1.
Proposition 3
1. For any 0 ≤ ψ < 1 there exist γ(r, ψ) ≤ γ(r, ψ) such that if and only if γ(r, ψ) < γ <
γ(r, ψ) there is a positive level of SEO that improves expected traffic for any error level.









2. For any 0 ≤ ψ < 1, there is a γˆ(r, ψ) such that ET (α) > ET (0) yields Epi(α) > Epi(0)
iff γ < γˆ(r, ψ).
3. γˆ(r, ψ) decreases in ψ for any 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
Figure 3 summarizes the results. The shaded areas depict the regions in which SEO increase
the efficiency of the organic result and thus expected traffic (bounded by γ(r, ψ) and γ(r, ψ)).
There are generally two regions where this happens: when γ is high and r is low and when γ is
low, r is high with ψ > 0. The former region is a straightforward generalization of our previous
results. When many consumers click on the organic links and the second site’s valuation is
relatively low, the first site has a good incentive to invest heavily in SEO, helping achieve the
desired organic result and increasing expected traffic. The former region is more interesting.
When there is a positive proportion of sophisticated consumers who click on the higher quality
link no matter where it is located the incentives change. The better quality site now has an
incentive to invest in SEO not because of a fear of not getting the clicks, but because of the
high expected costs of sponsored links. These costs are higher when the second player has a
relatively high valuation (r is high) and when many of the non-sophisticated consumers click on
the sponsored link (γ is low). This latter force also sheds light on when SE revenues are affected
by a high ψ. The solid curve on the figure depicts the boundary of the regions where a higher
traffic results in higher or lower profits. The area left of the curve is certainly beneficial for the
search engine, since both traffic and profits go up with a certain level of SEO, whereas profits
decrease with a higher traffic right of the curve. As it can be gleaned from the figure the area
below the curve is shrinking as ψ increases, consistent with the third point of the proposition.
The intuition is that when the proportion of sophisticated consumers goes up many consumers
will click site 1’s link. If site 1 won the organic link, the SE does not generate any profits from
clicks on its link, and the SE profits will be hurt. Therefore, when ψ is high the SE has higher
profits when the organic link goes to the lower quality site and r is high enough (right of the
curve).
In summary, our analysis of the interaction between organic and sponsored links, in addition
to showing how our main results generalize, uncovers interesting nuances. SEO can improve
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Figure 3: The figure shows the parameter regions in which SEO is beneficial with respect to expected
traffic and profits. The shaded areas depict the regions where SEO certainly improves the expected
traffic (ET+), whereas the solid curve separates the regions where SEO improves (decreases) expected
profits, denoted by Epi + (Epi−). Quality levels are q1 = 1 and q2 = 0.8 and r = r2/r1.23
the traffic of the search engine for the same reasons as in our basic setup and in many cases
this translates to increased profits. However, the search engine has to be careful in order to
avoid situations in which increased traffic leads to reduced profits. We identify two scenarios
when this happens. First, when a good organic list boosts the traffic to the SE and the high
valuation sites get satisfied with organic clicks, their valuation for sponsored links decreases,
leading to lower revenues. Second, when a high proportion of sophisticated customers click on
the higher quality link no matter where it is located, the SE profit suffers if the organic list is
better despite an increase in traffic. We would like to emphasize that the latter results on the
relationship between traffic and revenue hold in a general setting, regardless of search engine
optimization (even if it is non-existent) and shed light on the incentives of the search engine to
have high quality organic links. When searchers are able to find the best link among the results
with a high likelihood, sponsored and organic links serve as competing substitutes. As a result
the search engine is more likely to lose “alternative” revenues from sponsored links by offering
high quality organic links.
6 General Model with Multiple Links
In this section we show that our main results are robust under more general assumptions. We
focus on showing that SEO is beneficial to improving the ranking of organic links, and defer
analysis on the impact of sponsored links and search engine profits to future work. First,
we extend our model to allow multiple websites to compete for multiple links in one ranked
list. Second, we relax the assumption on the distribution of the search engine’s measurement
error. Finally, we consider the case of an incomplete information structure, where websites do
not know the values of the measurement errors induced by the search engine’s algorithm, and
analyze the resulting Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyze competition among sites on the
organic list solely, that is, when γ = 1 and ψ = 0.
The analysis is highly simplified by the use of a multiplicative scoring function instead of
an additive one. Thus, the ranking score of site i with quality qi is s˜i = q˜i · b˜αi · ε˜i. This scoring
function is equivalent to taking an exponent of our original additive function and maintains its
ordinal properties. However, we still assume that a website’s effort of b˜i costs b˜i, which results
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in a convex cost function. That is, the current multiplicative formulation is equivalent to our
additive model with an exponential cost of investment in SEO. Such a convex cost function is
common for investments and it is realistic in the case SEO, since it is harder to improve one’s
ranking after reaching a certain level.
The game still consists of n websites that are considered by the search engine for inclusion
in the organic list consisting of k links with qualities q˜1 > q˜2 > . . . > q˜n. Let q˜ = (q˜1, . . . , q˜n),
and let b˜ = (b˜1, . . . , b˜n) be the SEO expenditures of the n sites. Regarding the error ε˜i , we
allow its distribution to be arbitrary with c.d.f Fε˜ having finite support, a mean of zero and a
finite variance normalized to 1. Let ε and ε¯ be the lower and upper boundaries of the support
respectively, and assign ε˜ = (ε˜1, . . . , ε˜n). Similarly to Section 4, we assume that the error is
large enough that it makes a difference, that is, we assume that q˜iε < q˜i+1ε¯ for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Furthermore, let Φji be an indicator for site i appearing in location j among the top k sites.
Since, we assumed ψ = 0, we treat consumer search as an exogenous process and assume
that when site i is displayed in location j of the organic list, it receives βj clicks from a mass
one of consumers. We call this quantity the click-through rate. Given sites’ click-through rates,
we define ti as the total amount of visitor traffic a site receives in a list of k sites:









The profit of site i is thus pii(b˜, q˜) = Ri(ti(b˜, q˜)) − b˜i. We let pi = (pi1, . . . , pin). The first order







Our construction fulfills the conditions of Theorem 1 in Athey and Nekipelov (2010). To see
this, we first prove that a proportional increase in the bids of all other players decreases site i’s
profit by b˜i, which is a variation on Lemma 1 in Athey and Nekipelov (2010).
Lemma 3 Assume that ∂
∂b˜′pi(b˜, q˜) is continuous in b˜. Suppose that ti(b˜, q˜) > 0 for all i. Then b˜
is a vector of equilibrium bids satisfying the first order conditions in (5) iff d
dτ
pii(b˜, τ b˜−i, q˜)|τ=1 =
−b˜i for all i ≤ k.
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Using Lemma 3, we can rewrite the first order conditions by defining a mapping b˜ = λ(τ) that




pii(λi(τ), τλ−i(τ), q) = −b˜i (6)
We let V = [0, v1] × . . . × [0, vk] be the support of potential bids of players 1 to k, and define
D0(b˜, q˜) =
∂
∂b˜′pi(b˜, q˜) with the diagonal elements replaced with zeros. The following theorem
from Athey and Nekipelov (2010) establishes the conditions under which the mapping λ(τ)
exists locally around τ = 1 and globally for τ ∈ [0, 1], which yields the equilibrium bids of the
players.
Theorem 1 (Athey and Nekipelov (2010)) Assume that D0 is continuous in b˜. Suppose
that for each i = 1, . . . , k, ti(b˜, q˜) > 0, and that each pii is quasi-concave in b˜i on V and for each
b˜ its gradient contains at least one non-zero element. Then
1. An equilibrium exists if and only if for some δ > 0 the system of equations (6) has a
solution on τ ∈ [1− δ, 1].
2. The conditions from part 1 are satisfied for all δ ∈ [0, 1] and so an equilibrium exists,
if D0(b˜, q˜) is locally Lipschitz and non-singular for b˜ ∈ V except for a finite number of
points.
3. There is a unique equilibrium if and only if for some δ > 0 the system of equations (6)
has a unique solution on τ ∈ [1− δ, 1].
4. The conditions from part 3 are satisfied for all δ ∈ [0, 1], so that there is a unique equilib-
rium, if each element of ∂
∂b˜′pi(b˜, q˜) is Lipschitz in b˜ and non-singular for b˜ ∈ V 20.
The theorem shows that under very general conditions, websites would spend non-zero efforts
on SEO in equilibrium. We now proceed to analyze how positive levels of SEO effectiveness
α affect the satisfaction of consumers from the ranking of the organic list. To analyze the
incentives of the different websites, it is easier to transform the multiple links contest into a
20Athey and Nekipelov (2010) give example conditions for the non-singularity of the matrix D0 in their Lemma
2.
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game where websites choose the amount of traffic they would like to acquire from organic clicks,
which implicitly determines their bids. We define the vector of traffic for each site i given the
SEO effectiveness α and the vector of bids b˜ as tα(b˜) = (tα1 (b˜), . . . , t
α
n(b˜)). For each player i,
fixing the bids of other players as b−i, we can rewrite the first order condition of each player as
∂pii
∂ti






Analyzing the result of the SEO game with multiple links is hard. In addition, under certain
conditions, such as when the errors are small or α is very large, multiple equilibria might exist as
shown in Siegel (2009). We therefore proceed to analyze the special cases defined by Theorem
1 where an internal equilibrium exists for all players and the first order conditions hold for
players in equilibrium. For every α we define Tα = {tα|EU(tα) ≥ EU(t0)} as the group of
all traffic distributions over sites where the expected consumer utility is higher than under the
benchmark traffic distribution t0.
The following proposition shows that under certain conditions, a positive level of SEO can
improve consumer satisfaction. These conditions are sufficient, but by no means necessary. We
conjecture that much weaker conditions can be found under which SEO improves consumer
satisfaction.
Proposition 4 For each α such that there exists a vector of non-negative functions M(t) =








for every t ∈ Tα and ∂pii+1
∂ti+1
(t) 6= 0, the equilibrium distribution of traffic tα∗ satisfies EU(tα∗) >
EU(t0)
The conditions in (7) imply that the sequence of bounding function limits the changes in
profits of the different players from increased organic traffic. As a result, the existence of
such a sequence means that extra traffic does not yield “too steep” changes in players profits
and thus their incentives to decrease their expected amount of clicks in equilibrium. In such
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cases, allowing α > 0 improves consumer satisfaction from the resulting quality of ranking and
increases total traffic to the search engine.
7 Conclusion
Search engine optimization is a widespread phenomenon which affects consumer search abilities
and search marketing decisions tremendously. Our model of the phenomenon reveals that sites
investing in improving their search ranking without changing their link’s relevance essentially
participate in a contest for the top organic links. We find that some level of SEO can be useful to
the search engine and its customers because it acts as a mechanism that improves the rankings
by placing sites with high valuations for the links higher on the results list. In general, if sites’
valuations for consumers are aligned with how much utility consumers gain when visiting them
then SEO is beneficial to consumers and increases traffic to the search engine. We also find that
when the search algorithms of the SE are less accurate, higher levels of SEO are more likely to
be beneficial. Participating sites, on the other hand, might be worse off as they carry the extra
burden of having to invest in SEO, whereas if search engine optimization does not exist they
do not have to make additional effort. In the case when a low quality site has high valuation
for traffic, it can benefit from the presence of SEO and get to an undeserved, better position,
hindering search engine payoffs and consumer benefits.
We uncover important details about the interaction between the two sides of the market
that the search engine is surrounded by. We contribute to the growing literature examining the
implications of the quality of the organic results on sponsored revenues. Surprisingly, in many
cases SEO can not only increase the search engine’s traffic through improving the organic side,
but also its revenues from sponsored links. Nonetheless, there are certain condition under which
expected profits are lowered by better organic results. In particular, when consumers are very
sensitive to the quality of the search results, the boost in organic traffic may fulfill advertisers’
needs for clicks, lowering their willingness to pay for clicks. Moreover, when sophisticated
consumers place less trust in the ranking displayed by the search engine and they knowingly
click on the higher quality link no matter its location, profits may go down even though traffic
increases.
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Our paper has important practical implications. Contrary to the popular belief, allowing
sites to invest in improving their ranking without improving their relevance can be beneficial
to the search engine and the consumers, but can hurt the top sites even if they end up higher
in the rankings eventually. Our results explain why some search engines seem to work very
hard to reduce the possibility and effectiveness of SEO, while others like Baidu or Yelp offer
such services themselves. Our results suggest that when the search algorithms are not very
accurate or when SEO methods are hard to identify, allowing some level of black hat SEO
does not necessarily compromise the results. Despite the potential advantages, search engines
should be careful when considering the profit implications of SEO. In many cases SEO can
improve profits, but when consumers become very strategic in their clicking behavior revenues
from sponsored links may decline. Search engines usually keep track of their visitors’ clicking
actions and analyze their behavior, which in combination with our results could prove useful
to maximize profits.
Our results also provide important recommendations to websites that are competing for top
organic and sponsored links. Contrary to popular belief, sites engaging in SEO are not only
sites that wish to achieve a better position than their true quality merits, but also top quality
sites that need to defend their position. Moreover, an important problem that advertisers
face is how to allocate resources between the different areas of search engine marketing. The
paper provides useful guidelines in how much to invest in SEO and how much to leave for the
sponsored bidding.
We believe that the economics of search engine optimization is a topic of high importance to
both academics and practitioners. In this paper we examine the basic forces of this interesting
and unusual ecosystem. Given the complexity of the problem, our model has a number of
limitations that could be explored by future research. First of all, we model SEO as a static
game, whereas in reality sites invest in SEO dynamically, reacting to each other’s and the search
engine’s actions. Second, we take sites’ qualities and valuations as given and we do not account
for the possibility of investments that substantially improve content quality and/or valuations
for visitors. Finally, we do not explicitly examine how search engines can invest in reducing
SEO. Our results yield that under certain conditions having some SEO is beneficial, but we
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do not determine how much it is worth investing against SEO when it is too effective and is
detrimental. Depending on the costs of reducing SEO, it might be unprofitable for the search
engine to do so.
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Appendix A - All Pay Auctions with Headstarts
All pay-auctions with headstarts are generalizations of basic all-pay auctions. In traditional
all-pay auctions players submit bids for an object that they have different valuations for. The
player with the highest bid wins the object, but all players have to pay their bid to the auctioneer
(hence the term “all-pay auction”). When the auctioneer does not collect the revenues from the
bids which are sunk, the game is called a contest. If players have headstarts then the winner
is the player with the highest score - the sum of bid and headstart (see the Appendix and
Kirkegaard (2009) for details).
The level of headstart in our model depends on the starting scores and hence on the error.
For example, if q1 > q2 and ε1 = ε2 = 1, the error does not affect the order (which is q1 ≥ q2) nor
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the difference between the starting scores (q1− q2). Since SEO effectiveness is α, an investment
of b only changes the scores by αb, therefore the headstart of site 1 is q1−q2
α
. As the size of the
headstart decreases with α, the more effective SEO is, the less the initial difference in scores
matters. Even if site 1 is more relevant than site 2, it is not always the case that it has a
headstart. If ε1 = −1 and ε2 = 1 then sS1 = q1 − σ < sS2 = q2 + σ given our assumption on the
lower bound on σ. Thus, player 2 has a headstart of q2+2σ−q1
α
. By analyzing the outcome of the
all-pay auction given the starting scores, we can determine the expected utility of the SE and
the websites.
Appendix B - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: We decompose the final scores of both sites into a headstart h and
a bid as follows: s˜F1 = h + b1 and s˜
F
2 = b2 where h =
sS1−sS2
α
. The decomposed scores have
the property that s˜F1 ≥ s˜F2 ⇐⇒ sF1 ≥ sF2 for every b1, b2 and thus preserve the outcome of
the SEO game. Since the investments are sunk and only the winner receives the benefits (with




. In the following, we present the solution of such a game to facilitate the presentation
of the remaining proofs.
Solution of all-pay auctions with headstarts: As derived by Kirkegaard (2009), the
generic two player all-pay auction with headstarts has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium.
When players valuations are v1 ≥ v2 and player 1 has a headstart of h then s/he wins the
auction with the following probabilities:
W1(h) = Pr(1 wins|h ≥ 0) =
{











h ≥ v2 − v1
v21−h2
2v1v2
−v1 ≤ h < v2 − v1
0 otherwise
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For completeness, we specify the players’ cumulative bidding distributions. When h is positive,
F1(b) =

0 b ≤ 0
h+b
v2
b ∈ (0, v2 − h]
1 b > v2 − h
F2(b) =

0 b ≤ 0
1− v2−h
v1
b ∈ (0, h]
1− v2−b
v1
b ∈ (h, v2]
1 b > v2
(8)
When h is negative,
F1(b) =

0 b ≤ h
b−h
v2
b ∈ (h, v2 + h]
1 b > v2 + h
F2(b) =

0 b ≤ 0
1− v2−b
v1
b ∈ (0, v2]
1 b > v2
(9)
In our model, the value of the headstart is determined by the different realizations of the errors


















W1(h4) and the headstart does
not depend on v1 and v2, it is enough to show that W1(·) is increasing in v1 and decreasing in
v2. These easily follow from the definition of W1(·). The results on q1 and q2 follow from the
fact that h1, h3, h4 are all increasing in q1 and decreasing in q2, and W1(·) depend on them only
through h in which it is increasing.
Proof of Proposition 1: Since ET (α) = f(q2) + (f(q1) − f(q2))P (α), it is enough
to examine the function P (α) and compare its values with P (0). We use the notation Pi =
Pr(1 wins|hi). Given the above described equilibrium of the two-player all-pay auctions we have






















and P1 = 1 iff α ≤ α1, P3 = 1 iff α ≤ α3, P4 = 1 − v22v1 iff α ≥ α′4. Furthermore, it is easy to
check that α1 ≤ α3, α4 ≤ α3, and α4 ≤ α′4.
We proceed by separating the three parts of the proposition:
• Part 1: By setting α = α1, we have P1 = P3 = 1, and thus P (α) ≥ 3/4 for any σ.
• Part 2: In order to prove this part, we determine the α value that yields the highest
efficiency level for a given σ if v1/v2 > 3/2. As noted above, P (α) is a linear combination
of W1(h1), W1(h3), W1(h4). Since W1(·) is continuous and h1, h3, h4 are all continuous in
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α, it follows that P (α) is continuous in α. However, P (α) is not differentiable everywhere,
but there are only a finite number of points where it is not. Therefore it suffices to examine
the sign of P ′(α) to determine whether it is increasing or not. This requires tedious
analysis, since depending on the value of σ the formula describing P (α) is different in
up to five intervals. We identify five different formulas that P (α) can take in different
intervals and take their derivatives:
P ′(α) = P ′I(α) =
(q1 − q2 − 2σ)2
4α3v1v2
if α4 ≤ α ≤ α1&α′4,
P ′(α) = P ′II(α) = −
(q1 − q2)2
2α3v1v2
if α1 ≤ α ≤ α4,
P ′(α) = P ′III(α) = −





P ′(α) = P ′IV (α) =
4σ2 − (q1 − q2)(4σ + q1 − q2)
4α3v1v2
if α1&α4 ≤ α ≤ α′4,
P ′(α) = P ′V (α) = −





In any other range the derivative of P (α) is 0. It is clear from the above formulas






V (α) are always negative.
Furthermore, one can show that














then α4 ≤ α′4 ≤ α1 ≤ α3 and the derivative of P (α) takes the





fore P (α) is first constant, then increasing, then constant again and then strictly
decreasing. Thus, any value between α′4 and α1 maximizes P (α). Using the notation









then α4 ≤ α1 ≤ α′4 ≤ α3 and the derivative of P (α)





P ′III(α). Therefore P (α) is first constant, then decreasing, then strictly increasing,
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then depending on the sign of P ′IV (α) increasing or decreasing, and finally strictly




(q1 − q2) then α1 maximizes P (α), that is Aˆ(σ) =




(q1 − q2) then P (α) is constant between α1 and α′4, that is
Aˆ(σ) = [α1, α
′














then α1 ≤ α4 ≤ α′4 ≤ α3 and the derivative of P (α)





P ′III(α). In this case P
′












Therefore P (α) is first constant, then decreasing, then strictly increasing again and
finally strictly decreasing. Thus, there are two candidates for the argmax: α1 and
α′4. One can show that PIV (α
′










≤ σ then α1 ≤ α4 ≤ α3 ≤ α′4 and the derivative of P (α) takes the







Similarly to the previous case P ′IV (α) > 0, therefore P (α) is first constant, then
decreasing, then strictly increasing again and finally strictly decreasing. Comparing
the two candidates for the argmax yields that PIV (α3) > PII(α1) iff v1 > (3/2)v2,
that is α3 maximizes P (α) in this case.
In each of the cases above, it is clear that the maximum is higher than P (0) = 3/4. In
cases 1 and 2, P (α) is strictly increasing after a constant value of 3/4 and in cases 3 and
4 we directly compared to PII(α1) = 3/4. This completes the proof of Part 2.
• Part 3: One can derive the efficiency function for different cases as in Part 2. It follows




then P ′(α) is first 0 then negative and finally positive. Therefore











Proof of Corollary 1: In the proof of Proposition 1, we determined the values of α
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It is straightforward to check that all of α1, α3, and α
′
4 are increasing in σ and that the Aˆ(σ)
is increasing over the entire range.
Proof of Corollary 2: First, we describe the payoffs of the two players in an all-pay
auction with headstarts. When players follow the mixed strategies described in (8) and (9),
player 1’s payoff is:
pi1(h) =

0 h ≤ v2 − v1
v1 − v2 + h v2 − v1 < h < v2
1 h ≥ v2
where h is the headstart of player 1. The payoff of player 2 can be obtained from the same












Then following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can determine the values of





















































It is easy to see that with exception of the two cases when the optimal α is anywhere between
0 and α1, Player 1 is strictly better off with a particular positive level of SEO than without it.
Proof of Proposition 2: We use backward induction and start by analyzing the last stage
of the game, in which sites bid for sponsored link. Normally, there are multiple equilibria in
a second price auction with known valuation, but if we eliminate weakly dominated strategies
the only equilibrium is in which bidders bid their valuations and, thus, the highest bidder
wins. We can determine site’s valuations based on the outcome of the organic allocation. For
example, if site 1 gets the organic link its valuation for the total traffic from sponsored link
becomes vs,1,1 = R1(f(q1))−R1(γf(q1)), whereas site 2’s valuation is vs,2,1 = R2((1− γ)f(q1)).
If site 2 gets the organic link then sites valuations are vs,1,2 = R1((1 − γ)f(q2)) and vs,2,2 =
R2(f(q2)) − R2(γf(q2)), respectively. Consequently, one can determine the outcome of the
auction and the payoff of player i given that player k gets the organic link (where j 6= i):
pis,i,k = max(0, vs,i,k − vs,j,k).
One can the determine a players valuation in the SEO game. The players have the same
valuation for the organic clicks as before, but depending on whether they get it or not, they may
have an “option” value from the sponsored clicks. Therefore, player i’s valuation of acquiring
the organic link is
vi = Ri(f(qi)) + pis,i,i − pis,i,j,
where i 6= j. We can then apply the results of Proposition 1 to prove part 1 using the above v1
and v2. We just need to show that there is a γ < 1 such that v1 > (3/2)v2 as long as γ > γ. One
can determine the above valuations in two cases. If R2((1− γ)f(q1)) > R1(f(q1))−R1(γf(q1))
then
v1 = R1(γf(q1))−R1((1− γ)f(q2)) +R2(f(q2))−R2(γf(q2)),
v2 = R2(γf(q2))−R2((1− γ)f(q1)) +R1(f(q1))−R1(γf(q1)).
Otherwise,
v1 = R1(f(q1))−R2((1− γ)f(q1))−R1(f(q2)) +R2(f(q2))−R2(γf(q2)),
v2 = R2(γf(q2)).
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It is easy to check that when γ = 1 then v1/v2 = R1(f(q1))/R2(f(q2)) > 3/2. Since v1/v2 is
continuous in γ, there is a γ for which v1/v2 = 3/2, proving part 1.
For part 2, one has to determine the revenues of the search engine from the sponsored links.
Let pis,SE,k denote the revenue of the search engine when site k receives the organic link. It is
easy to determine that
pis,SE,1 = min(R1(f(q1))−R1(γf(q1)), R2((1− γ)f(q1))),
pis,SE,2 = R2(f(q2))−R2(γf(q2)).
Since R2((1− γ)f(q1)) > R2(f(q2))−R2(γf(q2)), we have that pis,SE,1 > pis,SE,2 iff R1(f(q1))−
R1(γf(q1)) > R2(f(q2)) − R2(γf(q2)). Since EpiSE(α) = P (α)(pis,SE,1 − pis,SE,2) + pis,SE,2 and
P (αˆ) > P (0), it follows that EpiSE(αˆ) > EpiSE(0) iff pis,SE,1 > pis,SE,2, completing the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3: For part 1, let δ = r1(0)
f(q1)−f(q2)
f(q1)2








yielding that the condition in the second part of the proposition is satisfied.
For parts 2 and 3, one can check that R1(f(q1)) − R1(γf(q1)) > R2(f(q2)) − R2(γf(q2)) if
f(q1) = f(q2). Since Ri and f are continuous, if f(q1) is only slightly higher, the inequality
still holds. This implies that if q1/q2 is close enough to 1 or f is not too much increasing, the
condition of the second part of the proposition is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3: We derive sites’ valuation and the search engine’s expected
profits similarly to how we do in the proof of Proposition 2. We get
v1 = max{R1((ψ + (1− ψ)γ)f(q2 + (ψ + (1− ψ)γ)(q1 − q2))),
R1(f(q1))−R2((1− (ψ + (1− ψ)γ))f(q2 + (ψ + (1− ψ)γ)(q1 − q2)))}
−R1((1− (1− ψ)γ)f(q2 + (1− (1− ψ)γ)(q1 − q2))) +R2(f(q2))−R2((ψ + (1− ψ)γ)f(q2)),
v2 = R2((1− ψ)γf(q2 + (1− (1− ψ)γ)(q1 − q2)))
−max{0, R2((1− ψ)(1− γ)f(q2 + (ψ + (1− ψ)γ)(q1 − q2)))
−R1(f(q1)) +R1((ψ + (1− ψ)γ)f(q1))}.
pis,SE,1 = min{R1(f(q1))−R1((ψ + (1− ψ)γ)f(q1)),
R2((1− (ψ + (1− ψ)γ))f(q2 + (ψ + (1− ψ)γ)(q1 − q2)))},
pis,SE,2 = R2(f(q2))−R2((ψ + (1− ψ)γ)f(q2)).
One can use the above expressions to determine the parameter regions in which which v1 >
(3/2)v2 yielding the functions γ(r, ψ) and γ(r, ψ). One can also check that v1 > (3/2)v2 holds
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(1− ψ)q2 + ψq1
)
2− ψ2q1 − q1 + ψ2q2 − ψq2
2 + ψ2q1 − ψq1 − ψ2q2 + 2ψq2 − q2 .
Furthermore, solving pis,SE,1 = pis,SE,2 yields
γˆ = 1− 2(f(q1)(f(q1)− 1)− rf(q2)(f(q2)− 1)
(1− ψ)(f(q1)2 − rf(q2)2) ,
which is clearly decreasing in ψ, completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3: We denote by P ji (b˜, q˜) the probability that site i appears in location j
among the top k sites. This probability equals P ji (b˜, q˜) =
∫
Φji (b˜, q˜, ε˜)dFε˜(ε˜). The total number





A proportional increase of all bids in b˜ does not change the expected rankings of the sites,
and keeps the expected number of clicks constant for all sites: ti(b˜, q˜) = ti(ηb˜, q˜) for any









ti(b˜, q˜) = 0.











Ri(ti(b˜, q˜)))− b˜i = −b˜i (10)
This identity can be rewritten as:
∂
∂τ
pii(b˜i, τ b˜−i, q˜)|τ=1 + b˜i ∂
∂b˜i
pii(b˜i, b˜−i, q˜) = −b˜i (11)
Thus, the FOC ∂
∂b˜i
pii(b˜i, b˜−i, q˜) = 0 holds for b˜i > 0 iff ∂∂τ pii(b˜i, τ b˜−i, q˜)|τ=1 = −b˜i
Proof of Proposition 4: Recall that Tα contains all traffic distributions t = (t1, . . . , tn)
for which the expected utility of consumers is weakly greater with an SEO effectiveness level
of α than with α = 0, implying EU(t) =
∑
i qi · ti ≥
∑
i qi · t0i .
Let β =
∑
j βj be the sum of the exogenous click-through rates. If we normalize the sum of
clicks
∑
i ti to 1 we have β =
∑
i ti. We then define, for each α, the mapping
Fα :
(t1, . . . , tn)
β
→ (M1(t) · |
∂pi1
∂t1






Above, for convenience of notation, α was dropped and the first orders ∂pii
∂ti
as well as the traffic
distributions ti are given under the specific α for each Fα. To simplify exposition we assign
t˜ = t
β
as the normalized traffic vector. This mapping has several special properties:
• The mapping maps a given traffic distribution to another, implicitly setting the required
bids to reach this traffic distribution. The input and output distributions are normalized
to one, so the mapping is closed on traffic distributions. In addition, the mapping is
continuous.
• The fixed points of each mapping Fα are the equilibrium distributions of the SEO game.
To see this, note that when the first order conditions hold and are equal zero, the mapping
has a fixed point, and vice-versa.
• The set of traffic distributions superior to U(t0) (which is Tα) is convex.
As a result, showing that the fixed points of Fα are superior to t
0 would prove that SEO
increases consumer utility in equilibrium. To see this, let t ∈ Tα. Then























As Mi(t) are non-negative and β =
∑





















∣∣∣∣ (qi − qj)
)
> 0 (13)




∣∣∣∣ (qi − qj) + tiMj ∣∣∣∣∂pij∂tj
∣∣∣∣ (qj − qi) = (tjMi ∣∣∣∣∂pii∂ti
∣∣∣∣− tiMj ∣∣∣∣∂pij∂tj
∣∣∣∣) (qi − qj) (14)
which is larger than zero when condition (7) holds.
This shows that the set Tα is convex and closed under the continuous mapping Fα. As
a result, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem tells us that a fixed point of Fα exists in Tα, which
concludes the proof.
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